IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING


HEARING
Heard before the Honorable Richard F. McDermott July 8, 2016
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Transcribed by: Shanna Barr, CETD

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\text { July 8, } 2016
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THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning, everyone.
ATTORNEYS: Good morning.
THE COURT: I'd like to go into findings of fact. It seems to me that it's the best place to start. And I read over the proposal by Plaintiffs and the response from the City and then the reply that the plaintiffs submitted, and I must admit -- and I guess I would start with Mr. Tierney and Mr. Taylor.

Whoever of you wants to respond, feel free, but I think that the reply of the plaintiff is right on here. If you had specific problems with specific findings, I would have expected you to have supplied your own. I didn't see that.

The problem with this case from day one has always, in my estimate, been that we've had a number of causes of action that have been combined, I think primarily out of necessity, actually, because of the overlapping evidence that is involved in trying to prove one theory or another theory or another theory. And I ordinarily do not like to have 58 findings, or whatever outrageous amount Mr. Andersen proposed. I don't usually like to have that many. I think it's -- well, I've never had that many, ever, so -- but I don't have a whole lot of choice here because you haven't
given me anything in opposition other than a general response, which, quite frankly, I wasn't looking for. So I'd like to know your response to that.

MR. TIERNEY: Thank you, Your Honor. What we wanted to point out to the Court was that what we thought was the proposed findings and conclusions had already been presented in the form of the $K \& S$ motion. And that's why we put forward in our brief was just use those --

THE COURT: Well --
MR. TIERNEY: -- that are already in there. And I wanted to get some response from the Court as to what it thought appropriate findings were, because from the ruling the Court made in the motion on the promissory estoppel was based on the findings that were proposed in the motion, and I thought the Court would say, well, that's what I'm going to go with. And I got the plaintiffs' response on that and I thought, well, we've pointed out what we think the findings should be. But, no, we did not pull them out and put them in a separate document, so last night that's what I did. I pulled them out. I put them in a separate document. There -- the findings that were in the motion, it's not the, whatever, 20 pages worth. It's seven pages worth. I can hand that up.

THE COURT: Well, I don't have it. MR. TIERNEY: I know. I did it last night, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do they have it?
MR. TIERNEY: No. I have it. I just brought it in to the court. I wanted to see what the Court had to say. If you were inclined to --

THE COURT: I'm inclined to enter separate findings, because I do think that although the damages are undifferentiated, and it's pretty clear -- and in my order, my last order awarding the plaintiff promissory estoppel or granting their motion on promissory estoppel my conclusion was that the damages that the jury awarded were undifferentiated, and therefore I'm not going to separate what is promissory estoppel and what is a takings claim, essentially. And so -- and I don't think the jury had intended to separate them. And the evidence is so -- "mixed up" is the wrong word. Is so intertwined among all of the claims that it would be, I think, almost impossible to say, well, this theory goes to promissory estoppel and this one doesn't. Because the evidence as a whole is what I considered in my judgment, and I think the evidence as a whole is what the jury considered in their judgment. And that becomes even more important when we talk about attorneys' fees. But that's part two of this hearing.

So I would love to see your proposed findings because I have never entered 58 findings of fact in my life and really hadn't planned on doing it on this case, but $I$ may have to.

So I would like to see them now. If you would just file the original and then give me a copy, please. Thank you. So the --

MR. TIERNEY: So basically these are out of Plaintiffs' motion, and the conclusion is taken from the proposed findings that they submitted. There wasn't a conclusion in the motion. So I can just say, Your Honor, it's a shorter version of what they submitted, and it is essentially complete compared to what was submitted with the motion.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. TIERNEY: Essentially. I don't want to say word for word because we typed it up out of the one and there may be some things that were in conclusions that are now in findings or vice versa, but it's basically the same paragraph.

THE COURT: And it does appear to have the basis for how I reached my decision.

But I want you to take a look at it, please, Mr. Andersen and Mr. Haberthur and Mr. Stephens, and respond.

MR. ANDERSEN: Could I be heard, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure. It's hard for me to stop you, Mr. Andersen.

MR. ANDERSEN: Why now? I mean, it's frustrating. We put in --

THE COURT: Well, we're -- we scheduled the whole day
because the Court anticipated this kind of thing based upon having all you folks before me for several years now, so we're going to go ahead and get this done today. MR. ANDERSEN: Okay. THE COURT: So...

MR. ANDERSEN: We -- and, actually, I had to buy Ms. Schauer coffee this morning because I thought you might want to make some changes to the findings fact and conclusions. So she's got it on her computer. But, Your Honor, I'm very --

THE COURT: Well, you and Mr. --
MR. ANDERSEN: -- frustrated, because there's a process. They had it for a long, long time.

THE COURT: Mr. Andersen, we're going to finish today. So we have the day so we're going to finish. And I guarantee you we'll be finished by 3:00 today, so you'll be on your way back.

MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you.
THE COURT: So look at what he has and look at yours and then let me know what you think, okay? And I'll give you 15 minutes, or less if you don't need as much time. I'll be back out in 15 minutes. Thank you.

MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you.
THE CLERK: Please rise.

THE COURT: Which one of you gentlemen wants to respond?
MR. ANDERSEN: I don't take issue with any of the proposed findings of fact by the City because they did take what $I$ submitted to you when we argued this.

THE COURT: It looked like it was pretty accurate factually. The issue is whether or not it goes far enough.

MR. ANDERSEN: Right. Now, they probably don't want you to find Fact No. 16 because otherwise you would finding damages of at least $\$ 12$ million. So I'm assuming that was a mistake by Mr. Tierney. If not, we certainly would love the Court to find that we were damaged $\$ 12$ million.

So, Your Honor, just quickly trying to go through these, well, they have different conclusions of law, and I'm not sure where they got the conclusions of law. So I guess I have no objections to their proposed findings of fact. What I tried to do in the 15 minutes was to circle my findings of fact that $I$ think we need in order to develop the record we need to support your decision on appeal.

THE COURT: I don't have any problems with their findings factually. I think that they're accurate. I read them over carefully. I don't think they go quite as far and -- but I don't think I need all of the findings that you have submitted either.

MR. ANDERSEN: Agreed.
THE COURT: And so what $I$ would like you to do is to
submit something in addition to me, if you would, please. And after we get done with all the attorneys' fees and the interest arguments, then you can do it all at once, but what I would really like to have is I anticipate a findings of facts around 30, 35 findings of fact --

MR. ANDERSEN: Okay.
THE COURT: -- with commensurate conclusions of law that would be consistent. There's one or two of their conclusions of law that we could probably argue about, but for the most part the findings of fact that they submitted are accurate. I just don't think they go far enough, and I would like you to be a little bit more extensive than what they have submitted.

MR. ANDERSEN: Could I do this? Could I have the chassis be my findings of fact, take his that he's used -- because I think the introduction, the court trial is just some background that doesn't matter one way or the other.

THE COURT: That's fine. I have found over the course of the last 16 -plus years that at this stage of the game it's better to be a little bit more inclusive than less inclusive for a whole bunch of reasons, so yes. But I think you were too inclusive in what you submitted to me.

MR. ANDERSEN: Sure.
THE COURT: And so I'd like to -- there's a happy medium in there someplace, and I really would like to get that done
soon.

MR. ANDERSEN: Let me just talk to big issues because I want to make sure that what we submit to you will work. As Mr. Tierney objected to anything related to damages -although he does have those in there so maybe that's not an issue anymore. He objects to anything related to the statute of limitations.

THE COURT: Well, I don't object to any of that.
MR. ANDERSEN: Okay.
THE COURT: That should be there because an appellate court has to know what the grounds were that I made my ruling. So, no, that's important.

MR. ANDERSEN: Okay. I think that answers the questions we have. Your Honor, we will try. I'll have --

THE COURT: But there's a bunch of stuff in yours that really don't need to be in there.

MR. ANDERSEN: We'll take care of that. And I think we can have that to you -- we'd work on it over the lunch hour.

THE COURT: Well, if you can have it today, great. I'm -we've had a very busy week, and I probably will start wearing down about 3:00, so I'd give you advance warning.

MR. ANDERSEN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. TIERNEY: Your Honor, on the damages issue, we do think the Court -- I included that because I said I was going to put in what they put in their motion. And I put it
in, but $I$ do object to findings on the damages. But that's -- the Court has to specify exactly what it wanted to find on the damages, but $I$ should have pointed that out that I left it as pristine as $I$ could --

THE COURT: Well, and I --
MR. TIERNEY: -- even though I didn't -- I wasn't really endorsing it, so...

THE COURT: I understand and I appreciate that. I believe that we should -- I ought to be able to -- give me enough that I can -- I may strike a couple of your findings and I may modify some of the conclusions a little bit, but give me something, try and get it to me in writing. I'm old school. I like to have a piece of paper in front of me. So please do that. Send it by Internet to Lisa and she'll print it out for me.

MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I'll do my very best to get it done this afternoon, but we have some other issues to resolve. And I'll get it -- we'll try and get all of those resolved today so that if the final pleadings aren't done they can be done early next week or perhaps even this weekend.

The next issue is -- that $I$ want to address is the issue of interest. And I left my notes on my desk, so I'm going to go get them. I'll be right back. You don't even have to stand. I'll be right back. And I have a method to my
madness as to --

> (Brief pause in proceedings)

THE COURT: Thank you all. Please be seated. Now, I am -- I put this question to Mr. Tierney or Mr. Taylor, whoever wants to address it. But I have reviewed the case of Sintra v. City of Seattle, decided by our State Supreme Court in 1997, and it's cited at 131 Wn. 2d. 640, and it was cited by Plaintiff's brief in their reply. And the issue becomes, number one, whether or not Plaintiff is entitled to 12 percent rather than some smaller amount. I believe you mentioned 2 percent. And, number two, when that begins to run. The plaintiff argues that it runs from the time of taking, which was December 30 of 2009 , and cites me Sintra in support of that theory, basically, and analogizes this kind of case to an inverse condemnation, or that kind of a takings, and cites the statute and talks about how the legislature was quite clear when they differentiated between this kind of case and other kinds of cases that may involve a government, a judgment against a government.

So go ahead, Mr. Tierney.
MR. TIERNEY: Well, I think the first thing to point out about Sintra is that the parties agreed early on in the trial that -- well, first of all, there was a claim made for, in essence, prejudgment interest in the case. And the parties agreed that that issue would be tried to the Court
and not submitted to the jury. And in the Sintra opinion, it specifically says -- and I can find the citation, but it's in the discussion on interest -- that ordinarily this is an issue for the jury to decide, but that since the parties agreed it would be tried to the judge. That's -- it was being resolved on a post-trial motion. That's the context of Sintra. Absolutely different from our case.

First of all, there was no claim made in this case for prejudgment interest. It's not in the request for relief. It's not in any of the pleadings. It's the first time we've seen it anywhere in this case is, oh, let's go back and let's give -- let's get the Court to award us an element of interest for prior to the -- this case, much less the judgment in this case. So that arose, whatever, two nights ago or whenever that brief was filed is the first time we've seen this in the case. Sintra, it was in the case from the get-go. So a big differences between those two.

THE COURT: Okay. Before you go any further, let me ask them to respond to that particular issue.

MR. TIERNEY: Okay.
MR. ANDERSEN: Your Honor, the -- we ask for interest. And if you look at the Supreme Court's decision --

THE COURT: Mostly I want to know what you asked for and when you asked for it. There's been a lot of claims here. MR. ANDERSEN: Right. So in our takings claim -- both in
the federal one, but that was -- that's still on hold in federal court. But on our state takings claim we ask for all interest allowed under the just compensation clause. Sintra says when private property is taken for public use our state and federal constitution require the payment of just compensation, which the Sintra court says is from the date of the taking. And so it's not pre- -- they specifically say -- Sintra says right here it's not an award of prejudgment interest on a liquidated sum in the traditional sense, but is a measure of the rate of return on the property owner's money if there had been no delay in payment.

So, Your Honor, we didn't have to ask for prejudgment interest because the Supreme Court says this is not under that category. It's not the conventional prejudgment interest. It's a part of the damages that we're entitled to. And the theory is that as soon as the government takes your property, the theory is you're entitled to that -- the value of that property going forward. So we didn't need to allege in the traditional sense we're seeking prejudgment interest. What we're seeking is the full value of the property that was taken and the last date it was taken. It may have been taken even before that, but we're being conservative when we say December 30th of 2009 because we had the temporary takings (inaudible) on the moratorium and
the development agreement, but we're taking a conservative approach and saying when they finally acquired this property for less than just compensation.

So, Your Honor, that whole theory about alleging prejudgment interest when the Supreme Court says interest in this context is not an award. This is on page 565 -- or 656, and this is headnote 5, Your Honor. It starts -- the paragraph starts with, "In a conventional imminent domain proceeding"?

THE COURT: Yes. I have it. "In a conventional imminent domain proceeding, property is not taken or damaged until just compensation is paid. But in an inverse condemnation or quick-take action, under RCW 8.04.090, property is taken before just compensation is paid. In these cases, we've held that interest is necessary to compensate the property owner for the loss of the use of the monetary value of the taking or damage from the time of the taking until just compensation is paid."

MR. ANDERSEN: And then if Your Honor -- just go down, skip down where it starts with "We assume a person."

THE COURT: "We assume a person who received the money value of his or her property as of the date of the taking has a beneficial use available for these funds. Interest in this context is not an award of prejudgment interest or on a liquidated sum in the traditional sense, but is a measure of
the rate of return on the property owner's money that -- had there been no delay in payment. The legislature codified these principles in the quick-take provisions of RCW 8.04.090 making the State liable for interest on the difference between what it pays into the court registry and the amount to which the owner is entitled."

MR. ANDERSEN: And then it goes -- the next paragraph, it talks about since inverse condemnation -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. In an inverse condemnation or temporary takings it's not under the aboveboard condemnations, but -- so the court construed the statute to say the property owner, who the constitution says is supposed to be made totally whole, is entitled -- or the statute says the highest interest rate possible, which is the 12 percent. And they're saying we're going to apply that back to the date that their property was actually deemed to have been taken. So it is a prejudgment interest. It's part of your -- if you take each claim with regard to -- well, I'll stop there. I think I can't argue better than the court has argued, both you and the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: I have forgotten how fast your talk, Mr. Andersen. We don't have a court reporter today. Mr. Tierney, your response? MR. TIERNEY: Well, for all of the speed of the discussion, $I$ still don't know what the answer is. I heard

Mr. Andersen say, "We asked for interest," and then I heard him say, "We don't have to ask for interest," and I want to know what the answer is to that.

THE COURT: Well, I'll --
MR. TIERNEY: I looked at the complaint. I looked at the -- I just looked at the complaint. I read the section on inverse condemnation and I read the request for relief and they don't ask for interest. Now, he's saying that they did. And maybe I missed it, and I'm perfectly open to being corrected, but let's establish, first of all, whether it's asked for in this case.

MR. ANDERSEN: Should I address that, Your Honor?
MR. TIERNEY: And then figure out where we stand. I may have missed it.

THE COURT: Your response, Mr. Andersen?
MR. ANDERSEN: "For a determination of just compensation for the permanent and taking of the property." "For a determination of just compensation." We just saw the Supreme Court establish that --

THE COURT: Is that in your original complaint for damages?

MR. ANDERSEN: Yes. It's -- I think it's in the original. I'm just looking at the third amended complaint, but we alleged it.

THE COURT: That's fine. Then you amended.

MR. ANDERSEN: Do you want a copy?
THE COURT: Yes, please. And just hand it to me and I'll hand it back to you. Just hand it to me and I'll hand it back to you. Thank you.

It reads, "For a determination of just compensation for the permanent and temporary taking of the property." I will decide today that the case of Sintra v. City of Seattle awards interest from the date of the taking; therefore, the interest runs from December 30th, 2009. That is what the jury decided. That is what -- that's the date that they decided the taking occurred. That's the date that I believe Sintra demands that interest be calculated from.

MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. TIERNEY: Your Honor, question of clarification. You said that's the date the jury decided that the taking occurred?

THE COURT: As far as I'm concerned, they decided a taking occurred. They decided the taking occurred when Mr. Kingen or $\mathrm{K} \&$ S lost their property. That date was December 30th, 2009. I don't really think that's an issue.

MR. ANDERSEN: We have a proposed judgment on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I know you do.
MR. ANDERSEN: Okay.
THE COURT: You have a proposal on a lot of stuff, but all
right.
The next issue is attorneys' fees. And I have a box on that, so let me go get that.
(Brief pause in proceedings)
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated.
Mr. Andersen, go ahead. Or Mr. Haberthur.
MR. ANDERSEN: Which -- Your Honor, there's two. We thought the best way to handle this -- and I'm going to start talking slower.

THE COURT: Whatever.
MR. ANDERSEN: The best way to handle this is you have our --

THE COURT: I think that only lasts for about 30 seconds.
MR. ANDERSEN: So the best way to handle it is our petition for attorneys' fees, Mr. Haberthur is going to handle their request for attorneys' fees. Mr. Haberthur is going to handle whether they're legally entitled to attorneys' fees. If we get to the point of talking about reasonable amounts of their fees, then you'll have to listen to me again. Otherwise, Mr. Haberthur -- so I don't know if you want to start with ours first and then go to theirs? Okay.

THE COURT: Since you're asking for over 2 million, that seems to be a reasonable place to start.

MR. HABERTHUR: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel.
MR. HABERTHUR: So K\&S is asking for its fees under the takings statute. I don't think that's disputed. I think the main issue that $I$ want to talk about is we have agreement, it sounds like, on the rates are reasonable. There's some issue about the amount of time, but I think what I'll start --

THE COURT: There's some issue on duplicative -- multiple lawyers being at the depositions and being in court hearings and what have you.

MR. HABERTHUR: Your Honor, I -- that is in there. And maybe I'll start at the very beginning, because I think it's important for the Court to know what steps I took to review our fees before I submitted them, because I think that's a critical piece that the Court needs to be aware of because considerable amount of time went into looking at the fee request first to try and take out any time that was unrecoverable related to, maybe, Colliers', you know, part of the case, unsuccessful motions.

And just by way of numbers, I first started at about $\$ 2.29$ million. By reviewing that, $I$ was able to reduce that by $\$ 431,000$. So a significant amount was taken off, about 18, 19 percent. There is probably some time in there with some overlap that was duplicative, but I think the Court would agree this was an extremely complex case. There's a
lot of facts. It spanned a very large period of time and probably one of the more complicated cases we've seen in a while. A lot of different theories went into this, and as the Court has already mentioned, those were intertwined. The facts were not -- you know, those stayed the same, but a lot of the theories did intertwine, and it's very difficult to try and segregate those out.

So what I did next was reduce the paralegal time because I think there probably was a question of "Is this pure paralegal, is it clerical?" So another 42,000 came off the top.

And there is case law, the Bright case versus Frank Russell Investments, the most recent case, that talks about rather than spending the time to go through line item by item and make those adjustments the Court has authority to make a percentage reduction. And that's what we've proposed. We did have an expert review our billings to make sure that they're appropriate, the time was reasonable, and we submitted that. Off of that, there was a recommendation --

THE COURT: They argued that I should not consider former Justice Talmadge's declaration and his analysis because it wasn't appropriate. What is your response to that?

MR. HABERTHUR: Your Honor, I think Mr. Talmage is an expert on this issue. I think he's wide regarded in

Washington, has a broad depth of the case law and the various approaches taken by the court. Mr. Talmage, I think, was trying to be very careful not to invade to province of the Court and tell you how to do your job, but to give the Court guidance on --

THE COURT: He's done that on several other instances.
MR. HABERTHUR: Not in this case, Your Honor.
THE COURT: No, not on this case.

MR. HABERTHUR: But I think the declaration is helpful to go through the lodestar approach, and Mr. Talmage makes the recommendation of a 15 percent reduction, which we've applied. So overall, those together, is --

THE COURT: But his argument of 15 percent is in response to their judgment on their theories.

MR. HABERTHUR: I think it's -- I think that that's the main thrust of it, but $I$ think it also is supposed to take care of any type of time that was duplicative or maybe not recoverable. And what we've ended up with is a 70 percent request from our original amount, and so that puts it at \$1.6 million. I know that there's other costs and expert fees that push it to 2 million, but we started at 2.2 and we're down to 1.6. And perhaps the Court wants to make a further adjustment. That's probably a lot easier than the Court reviewing all of those billings. I have done that, and $I$ can tell you that was a multiple-hour endeavor. But,

Your Honor, we think that that 1.6 is a reasonable amount given the amount of time that was spent on this case and the amount of time in trial.

I know that there was an issue raised about the number of attorneys that were involved, and as the Court is aware, that this case was passed from the Ashbaugh firm to the Landerholm firm, where we finished it out. There were some other experts that we consulted with, including Mr. Stephens for his guidance on the constitutional issues, and that contributed to the recovery here.

So are there specific facts or issues the Court wants me to address on the overall billings?

THE COURT: No. I think it would be -- I'll withhold my comment. I want to hear what Mr. Tierney or Mr. Taylor have to say. I think that -- I think you've done a commendable job for trying to go through. I went through some of what you had submitted. I was in practice myself for over 26 years, and I think I have a pretty good idea of what billable rates are. And you have a very thorough -- I used to manage a law firm, and you have a very thorough way of summarizing your bills, and it was helpful to me, and I appreciate that.

MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I've certainly seen a lot worse. Trust me.

MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So I -- and I appreciate the effort you went through to try and be reasonable.

MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Tierney.
MR. TIERNEY: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to start with the question of what is the gross amount of bills that were -- what's the starting point? What's the gross amount of attorneys bills that $K \& S$ incurred?

THE COURT: Well, I think he started at 2.2 .
MR. TIERNEY: Yeah. And I don't see that number anywhere.
I don't know where that comes from. It's not in a
declaration. And I'd ask the Court, do you have the --
THE COURT: I didn't go through and add everything up.
Maybe I should have, but --
MR. TIERNEY: Well, do you have the Haberthur declaration with you?

THE COURT: I think I probably do.
MR. TIERNEY: If you could turn to page 5 of that?
THE COURT: All right.
MR. TIERNEY: It's paragraph 19.
THE COURT: I have it.
MR. TIERNEY: It says there he adds up all the -- or he describes all the firms, and he says their total is

1,945,000, costs are 76-plus. K\&S total attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the case is $2,021,000$. Do you see that? THE COURT: I do.

MR. TIERNEY: That's the only number I have seen that is the starting point of their analysis. I don't know where the other comes from. And, again, I'm happy to be corrected because there's a lot of stuff here. And I just went -- I looked at what's in the declaration, and then $I$ looked at the exhibits to try to piece together what had happened. Because what Mr. Haberthur had said in his declaration is he took the gross amount of the bills, and in their term, they "scrubbed" them. They scrubbed them and took out all of the duplicative or extra work or issues that weren't related to the takings. That's what he said he did. And I don't see where that happens. And I'd be happy to be corrected on it. But what I did was go to the exhibits. The Landerholm bills are Exhibit $J$ and the Ashbaugh bills are Exhibit F, okay? THE COURT: Um-hum.

MR. TIERNEY: So Exhibit J and Exhibit F. And I thought, well, he says they struck out a lot of time, they subtracted time from those bills. And I looked at the bills. The copy I got doesn't have anything stricken out, not one hour. I don't see where it ever occurred. I hear them saying it. And like I said, I might be missing it, but if they can show me where any time was cut from the gross amount in this
scrubbing process then we'll have a starting point. And --
THE COURT: Okay. Don't go any further. Let me ask Mr. Haberthur to respond.

MR. HABERTHUR: Your Honor, I see where we're going. I can answer this very clearly. The burden is on the party seeking fees to submit what I'm going to call "clean" billings to the court. I didn't give you everything. Frankly, I didn't think you wanted to waste your time looking at all of that because $I$ know a large chunk of it that I took out wouldn't be recoverable. I probably was a little bit heavy with the editing. But I didn't want to give the Court a bunch of fees that we weren't seeking, and so I did that work the first time. Because the starting point, Your Honor, is what was submitted to the Court. I'm not asking for the fees that I've already removed, scrubbed, excised. Those are taken out. So the starting point is what's before the Court today. I mentioned those numbers this morning just to give a frame of reference.

THE COURT: No, I understand.
MR. HABERTHUR: But --
THE COURT: So you're saying the starting point after you did your scrubbing is 1.9 , basically.

MR. HABERTHUR: Yes, Your Honor. And then the 15 percent reduction got us to the 1.6 .

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HABERTHUR: But, Your Honor, I think the case law is very clear --

THE COURT: We'll talk about that in a minute.
MR. HABERTHUR: Okay. All right.
THE COURT: Mr. Tierney.
MR. TIERNEY: Well, I think that's problematic,
Your Honor, because, well, one, we --
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this question,
Mr. Tierney. They're entitled to attorneys' fees. The case law supports it. What do you think a reasonable fee is for them?

MR. TIERNEY: Well, I think a reasonable fee -- you mean a -- we're not challenging their hourly rates, if that's the question.

THE COURT: No. I understand that. And that was represented to me by counsel.

MR. TIERNEY: I think there has to be a percentage -- if you're asking me, I can only go on what we see in our bills as what was devoted to the issues that we prevailed on and what was devoted to where it appeared the plaintiff prevailed, which was basically the first time frame. I divided that 55/45.

THE COURT: Well, so let me give you a hypothetical. Hypothetically, they're asking for 1.9 million in attorneys' fees. You're not disputing the rate per hour, but you're
saying that they should only get 55 percent of that; is that correct?

MR. TIERNEY: In essence, I think. But we have to see where we -- how we get to that starting point.

THE COURT: This is your time to tell me.
MR. TIERNEY: I just asked for it and was told that the material was not provided.

THE COURT: I'm convinced that 1.9 million of fees is what was -- is what they're seeking and is what was billed. I could go through and add up page by page. But there were a number of pages that had $10,000,70,000$, and I stopped adding at some point way after midnight one night because I decided it would be much more beneficial for me to use my time talking like we're talking now. Because I have to apply a lodestar figure. I believe that also is the law and the requirement for me to apply a lodestar figure, and I think, therefore, that the 1.9 million, which I'm convinced is an amount that is -- the plaintiff's are seeking in attorneys' fees, needs to be reduced by a certain amount. Mr. Haberthur says it should be reduced by approximately 15 percent, which gets us down to 1.6. You say 55 percent, which -- or by 45 percent.

MR. TIERNEY: Reduced by 55.
THE COURT: It needs to be reduced by 45 percent, which gets us down to a little over a million. So tell me why.

MR. TIERNEY: Because what's missing is showing some sort of method for determining out of that -- let's say I agree, all right. It's 1.9 is the post scrubbing number. And my first point was just they say that, but they haven't given us that information, but -- so we'll take that, so...

THE COURT: You and I aren't going to agree on that, but I can going to find that that is the post-scrubbing number, period.

MR. TIERNEY: That's -- I'm not disputing. I'm just pointing out that $I$ didn't have that material and I don't see it, so it's hard to -- but I think we need information in order to determine what percentage should be reduced. So the way I went about it in my bills was I looked at -- I gave the Court a hundred percent of our bills. Not post scrubbing. A hundred percent. And I tried to show the scrubbing process for us, which was to look at these things and say, well, some of these it's clear what they were on, others it's not clear what they were on, and we have to do the best we can do to divide between what are attorneys' fees claims and what are not attorneys' fees claims. And I did that process for us and I came up with 55 and 45. That's where my number comes from.

And what I would propose -- what I would have expected from the plaintiffs was show us what you took out. Show us how you divided up between what was related to what you're
asking fees for and what it is that your agreeing that you're not asking fees for. And we don't have that to see. So all $I$ can do is fall back on the percentages that $I$ derived from our bills. And I started with a hundred percent.

And I will admit, Your Honor, it is a very imperfect process to look at bills and say, all right, we're talking about discovery issues. So discovery issues on what claim or what not claim? So I -- we took a limited amount where it was clear what the fees were for and we created a ratio based on that. And I fully admit that that is an imperfect process. But I showed the work at least. And that's what I am saying is missing in the plaintiff's is showing some basis to cut 10 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent, whatever the number is. Show us an analysis that gets you that number. And $I$ think instead all that the Court is left with is saying from the plaintiff: We think you should cut 15 percent off, and we got a declaration from another lawyer that says he thinks 15 percent is good, too, so...

THE COURT: You objected to Phil Talmadge's declaration. MR. TIERNEY: Yes.

THE COURT: And the way --
MR. TIERNEY: I think that's the Court's function.
THE COURT: The way -- well, the way I look at it is that Mr. Talmage, who has been before me several times, and who
has lost probably more than he has won, I think is a really, really good lawyer who $I$ respect, but he's just giving us an opinion. He doesn't carry the day, and I'm not intending to think in any way that his declaration or suggestions are in any way mandatory for me to follow. They're a suggestion -which I appreciate suggestions, quite frankly. I think you all know -- you've been in front of me enough to know that $I$ will take constructive suggestions any way $I$ can, and that's how I take this. But that's all I take it as.

MR. TIERNEY: I agree that that's all that it is, Your Honor, and I -- my point is that there -- this is an analytical exercise and it's a very imperfect one and -THE COURT: Boy, it really is, Counsel.

MR. TIERNEY: Yeah.
THE COURT: One of the hardest thinks we have to do in any case is to try and award attorneys' fees because they're -number one, it's discretionary, and, number two, we've got this ridiculous thing called a lodestar in the state of Washington that nobody really understands how it works. It works to the benefit of whoever it is who is asking us to apply it, but it -- you know, and I don't know that the Supreme Court really understands how it works either. I've tried to read cases on it over the years that would give me some grounds for clarification and assistance, and I haven't found very much. So I do know that it's pretty
discretionary with the trial judge.
I also know that attorneys' fees are warranted in this case because of the law. I believe that that's not always the case. A lot of situations, attorneys' fees are not warranted. A lot of situations, there's no statute, there's no case law. In the state of Washington, thankfully, I suppose in some ways, we don't have very many cases where we do award attorneys' fees, but this is an exception to that. So --

MR. TIERNEY: So --
THE COURT: Because of the unique issues involved, I believe that there's ample authority to award fees.

MR. TIERNEY: Well, Your Honor, we're not contesting that at all.

THE COURT: Yeah, I know that.
MR. TIERNEY: And if --
THE COURT: And your response is --
MR. TIERNEY: Yeah. It's just a question, all right, given this gross amount, what do you -- how do you go about picking a percentage that's going to be awarded? And, you know, I'm saying that it's --

THE COURT: Well, I have to consider the amount of your fees. I have to consider the fact that you obtained a judgment on behalf of your client on a couple of theories that, quite frankly, should be subtracted from the plaintiff's gross amount in a final judgment. And then I -I also have -- I thought a lot about this because I think the hourly rates are fair and reasonable, but I also think that there was some duplication of effort. I know that -and I trust what Mr. Haberthur said about trying to scrub as much as he could out, but $I$ still think there's no duplication in there. And there is also a setoff because of the issues that the defendants prevailed on.

So before we finish this, $I$ would like to ask about the expert fees. It seems to me you're only entitled to expert fees on those theories that you prevailed, and you're not entitled to expert fees on the theories you didn't prevail on, and so I'm not sure that you get all the expert fees that you wanted to get. Now, the attorneys' fees, I'm assuming that Mr. Stephens and his partner's fees are included in the attorneys' fees and not on the expert fees.

MR. ANDERSEN: Correct.
MR. HABERTHUR: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And I assume that's part of the 1.9 million, which is your net.

MR. HABERTHUR: That's correct, Your Honor. The expert --
THE COURT: And I'm assuming that Ashbaugh's firm also is included in that number?

MR. HABERTHUR: That's correct.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. So tell me about experts,

Mr. Haberthur. It seems to me you've asked for a little too much on the expert fees.

MR. HABERTHUR: Your Honor, the statute does allow for expert fees, so we have asked for --

THE COURT: The statute, $I$ think, begs the question -- the statute, I don't think, ever assumed that there would be nine causes of action of which you prevailed on three or four and not on the others, and therefore you should only get the expert fees on those causes of action on which you prevailed.

MR. HABERTHUR: Your Honor, if I understand correctly, the City is taking issue with Mr. Hill and Mr. Johnson as far as the expert fees. Are those --

THE COURT: They are.
MR. HABERTHUR: -- the two to address?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. HABERTHUR: Mr. Hill was a nontestifying expert, as the Court is aware. He was hired. The thought was he would likely testify at trial. Mr. Hill was deposed, and the Court later entered an order stating we had to go with only a couple of experts.

THE COURT: You have to pick one or the other and you picked --

MR. HABERTHUR: Oh, sorry. That was on the planners, Mr. Geyer or Mr. Thorpe.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. I'm sorry.
MR. HABERTHUR: So Mr. Hill, I believe --
MR. ANDERSEN: We just didn't call him.
MR. HABERTHUR: Yeah. Just didn't call him at trial, but he would have testified in response to some of the plaintiffs' -- or the City's witnesses. He did not actually testify. He was just a consulting expert for us. I think his fees were in the neighborhood of 25-, 30,000 dollars.

THE COURT: I thought 24 -something, but whatever.
MR. HABERTHUR: Yeah, so right in there. He did provide a valuable service to us, Your Honor, but if -- honestly, it's not a huge amount, and we'd be --

THE COURT: Well, I'm inclined not to award his fees to you. Because $I$ think a strict reading of the statute, he's a consulting expert that you chose to hire and work with you and -- but I don't think I'm going to award that.

MR. HABERTHUR: That's fair, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The other one.
MR. HABERTHUR: Mr. Johnson was the damages expert.
THE COURT: He did testify.
MR. HABERTHUR: He did testify. I believe -- I was trying to put my finger on it. I believe his fees were right around 200,000. And, I'm sorry, I lost my place there, but --

MR. TIERNEY: 207, I think.

MR. HABERTHUR: I'm sorry?
MR. TIERNEY: I think it was 207.
MR. HABERTHUR: 207. Thank you.
MR. TIERNEY: I think.
MR. HABERTHUR: Right around 200,000. Mr. Johnson did do a lot of work in this case. The damages --

THE COURT: I hope he did.
MR. HABERTHUR: It wasn't just "throw it up against the wall." It was quite a bit of work. I'd also like to point out that Mr . Johnson was deposed for, I think, right around 10 hours. So a significant amount of work was done by Mr. Johnson just to address discovery issues, work with us on the different scenarios, which I think the Court would agree were fairly complex. The facts in this case were such that a significant amount of work was done to not only come up with those scenarios but to rule out other things. So we think that amount is a reasonable amount.

And, Your Honor, reading the statute in the context of just compensation and what the constitution is supposed to provide, it's supposed to make an unwilling seller of property whole, and that's what the point of the cost is. So we believe that those costs should be recoverable because we have to put that evidence on in order to recover our damages, and it was relied upon by the Court.

THE COURT: Did Mr. Johnson assist you in the discovery
process?
MR. HABERTHUR: Mr. Johnson assisted with the timelines that we helped put together, so he was -- before he would do anything, he had to read the materials and verify and not just take our word for it.

THE COURT: Did you require the assistance of an expert to obtain the discovery that you believe the City had and you made a public records disclosure request, and then you followed up with more requests and ended up finding more information and material?

MR. HABERTHUR: That's --
THE COURT: Did he help you with that?
MR. HABERTHUR: Not --
THE COURT: Was he telling you that there was stuff missing?

MR. HABERTHUR: I don't recall that, Your Honor. He assisted at the end with some of --

THE COURT: And Mr. Murphy, his fees were part of the attorneys' fees portion?

MR. HABERTHUR: No, Your Honor. We did not include Mr. Murphy. We did include Mr. Overstreet with the Allied Law Group in the attorney fee component. It was between 8or 9,000 . I think $\$ 8,500$. He was the one that did the public records request.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HABERTHUR: But Mr. Murphy's fees were not included, and that includes time testifying at trial. Those we didn't ask for.

MR. TIERNEY: He didn't bill.
MR. HABERTHUR: I don't know for certain.
THE COURT: Did you ask for his fees that he incurred during the negotiation that he participated in with the City?

MR. HABERTHUR: No, Your Honor. No. The attorneys' fees started with the Allied Law Group shortly after the deed in lieu, and then it was just a very small -- I mean, $\$ 8,500$. And then it went to the Ashbaugh firm. There was some time from the Schwaby (phonetic) firm, where Mr. Andersen was at prior to Landerholm, but again, that was a fairly small amount, and then to Landerholm. So we're not seeking any of Mr. Murphy's fees or Mr. McInerney's fees. As the Court may remember, he was also involved in the deed in lieu negotiations and then afterwards, but we didn't include these bill ings after.

THE COURT: And it was until his unfortunate passing?
MR. HABERTHUR: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I remember that.

MR. HABERTHUR: And, Your Honor, the last point about Mr. Johnson is that testimony was required under the jury instructions. The Court may remember Jury Instruction 7
specifically talked about the takings and what damages would be required to be proven, and Mr. Johnson testified to that. And we did bring a copy if you'd like to review that.

MR. TIERNEY: May I approach the bench?
THE COURT: I actually printed those out the other day, but I left them on my desk, so I'd like to see that again. MR. ANDERSEN: Oh, here's the complete set.

THE COURT: You might tell counsel what you're handing me. MR. ANDERSEN: And I'll give him copies, too. These are instructions -- Jury Instructions No. 7 and Jury Instruction No. 27.

MR. HABERTHUR: So on reviewing Instruction No. 7, you'll see on the first page there that the jury was asked to consider the economic impact on $K \& S ' s$ property and the extent to which the actions interfered with K\&S's reasonable, distinct investment-backed expectations. And that's exactly what Mr . Johnson testified to. So the fees, we believe, should be recoverable. There probably could be a question about the amount. But all of the billings are submitted, and we don't believe any of that time was duplicative, and a lot of it was driven in response to the facts and as this lawsuit progressed to trial.

THE COURT: Any response, Mr. Tierney?
MR. TIERNEY: Yes, Your Honor. There are some important distinctions. They may sound like fine points, but they're
very important distinctions in the law of inverse
condemnation. There's a difference between the character of a taking and the damages resulting from a taking. There's a difference between the goal of just compensation and what that measurement consists of. Those are each separate things. The character of a taking can be determined by the effect of a regulation on investment-backed expectations. That determines whether the nature of the regulation amounts to a taking. That isn't a measure of damages. That's an analysis of a character of a taking. The measure of damages in a takings case is the difference between the decline in the market value of the property at the time of the taking.

So in a regulatory taking's instance, if you impose wetland regulations and you reduce the value of the property from a million dollars to $\$ 750,000$, the takings is that reduction in value, is that $\$ 250,000$ item. That's an appraisal issue. That's a measure of damages that's done by an appraiser. The goal of using that measure of damages is for just compensation. Now, just compensation isn't an elastic concept that's used to -- for any kind of approach to damages. The Peterson case, which we cite a couple of times, the Tony v. Olympic Pipeline case, those are takings cases, and they -- and the doctrine of the -- the principles long established in Washington law as to what the measure of damages, and the measure of damages is a decline in market value of the property. Just like a regular imminent domain case. You know, what's the government willing to pay for the property? What does the jury decide what the property is worth? That's what the award ends up being is that difference.

So Mr. Johnson didn't testify about the damages from taking. The damages from taking are a decline in market value. Mr. Johnson testified about other measures of damages for other causes of action: The tort claims, the -their attempt at getter contract damages, the misrepresentation claims. Those -- his main focus in his testimony was on the profit stream, was on what could they have made if they had built a park-and-fly at different points in time. And then under other scenarios, it was what could they have made if they built apartments at different points in times. So it had to do with an income stream, which is a tort measure of damages. And that's an important distinction here. You know, what did Mr. Johnson actually testify about in terms of the relevant damages? And what he testified about were tort damages. And presumably, according to the plaintiffs' arguments on promissory estoppel, he testified about promissory estoppel damages because they're saying a hundred percent of the damages are also promissory estoppel damages. And they can't all be the same thing because some are an entirely different measure.

And Mr. Johnson only testified about those tort damages, not about takings damages.

That's our position on Mr. Johnson's fees, entirely apart from the fact that it was a damages expert that they spent 200-something thousand dollars on, which I've never come across. But leaving that aside, what he testified about was not takings damages. That's our argument.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Any response?
MR. HABERTHUR: Your Honor, Mr. Johnson testified to show the economic impact that the takings had on $K \& S$. Beyond that, trying to parse it out as to what the jury relied upon how they awarded damages, that's too difficult. That's not what we're here to argue. But the Jury Instruction No. 7 on the takings claim does have very specific instructions to the jury that they had to use that evidence from Mr. Johnson. So whether Mr. Johnson was the right guy, that's really not the issue. It's what did Mr. Johnson testify to the takings fees, and that was the economic impact it had on $K \& S$.

THE COURT: All right. I'm -- this is an undifferentiated amount of money. And the jury didn't say, well, we award this much on a takings and we award this much on a lost potential income and we award this much on all the money and time and effort that $K \& S$ had to go through to try and comply
with the City's requirements that were constantly changing. What they decided was this amount of money -- 9.3, approximately, million dollars -- was the total amount of damages that would be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

When I made my interest award, I believe that you have to pick a date, and the date for my purposes was December 30th, 2009, because I think that's really the last date that I could have picked. But I believe that the plaintiffs were damaged and suffered damages and suffered losses for several years before that, and that includes trying to negotiate with the City and hiring experts and hiring lawyers and hiring -- and working with the City to try and comply with the City's requirements, that seemed to be a work in progress, seemed to be continuing. "Well, if you do this, it will be okay." And then, "No, we've changed our mind. If you do this, it will be okay." That started, what, 2004, 2005. So the damages really started then. So my picking December 30th, 2009, is -- I think you have to pick a date that you go back, and that seems to be the date that is, in my opinion, quite frankly, the most conservative date to pick. Because it's really when Mr. King had lost the property, and so he clearly at that point in time had no recourse except the lawsuit. So that -- I want to clarify that. I want to make sure that the findings clarify that
point as well.
Also, Mr. Johnson, I'm not going to give you 207,000. I don't -- I do agree with Mr. Tierney. I've never seen a damage expert bill that much, but -- and I've seen a lot of bills. But I think, under the circumstances, for Mr. Johnson the Court will award $\$ 150,000$.

MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you.
THE COURT: And there's no money for Mr. Hill, as I think I indicated before.

Attorneys' fees. There is a lodestar factor. I do think that the law indicated by Mr. Talmage and his material is pretty accurately stated, and it's the same law that $I$ think is proper. I've always thought that what he has indicated in his brief is what I've tried to follow in the past when I've looked at attorneys' fees, and there's nothing different in there than my understanding of the law. If the appellate courts think differently, it would be a departure, it seems to me, from what the current status of the law is.

I do think that a lodestar amount -- I think that the defendants are entitled to a reduction because they did prevail on a couple of the claims, and the plaintiff did dismiss a couple claims, and we ended up with -- we started with nine or ten claims, I think, and we whittled that down to four or five. So I do think that -- and the defendants
obtained a setoff, it seems to me, by the jury. What? 257,000 or 227,000 by the -- on award -- on their award from the jury on the contract violations, and under that they're entitled to attorneys' fees as well.

So it seems to me, taking everything into consideration, and the fact that Colliers was an intimate part of this and then you ended up dismissing them or resolving your dispute with them at the last minute and they went away, so any amount of money that could arguably be attributed to Colliers has to be subtracted from your award also.

So I'm willing to award -- I'm going to assume -- I'm going to take your at your word, Mr. Haberthur, and that the plaintiffs are seeking $\$ 1.9$ million in attorneys' fees, all right?

MR. HABERTHUR: Correct.
THE COURT: And I'm going to apply a 65 percent lodestar figure to that. You're entitled to 65 percent of that, having -- taking into consideration all of what $I$ just said. I think that that's fair and reasonable.

I also want to make sure that there is no mistake on the part of the defendants or the plaintiff that the City engaged in a pattern of deception that lasted years, and because of that, the Kingens' damages are not just limited to losing the property. The Kingens' damages spanned a number of years. I'm sure -- I didn't talk to the jury. I
don't talk to jurors about why they decided certain things. I leave that for the attorneys to do because $I$ don't think it's proper for a judge to ask jurors why they decided an issue in a certain way. The attorneys sometimes come and tell me later after they've spoken with the jurors, but I don't seek that information. I am supposed to be a referee. I'm supposed to do the very best I can to give the jury the proper law and make sure that they get evidence which is appropriate and then they have to do their job, and I try very hard not to interfere with that. So I don't know everything that they considered when they made their award. I can only surmise, based on how $I$ felt listening to the evidence during the course of the trial, that the jury was upset with the actions of the City.

A government entity owes a duty of honesty and transparency to those people to whom they deal with. It doesn't matter who those people are. It doesn't matter whether they like those people or they don't like those people. Governments are in unique positions. There is a Public Disclosure Act. There are all kinds of cases in this state which uniformly say that governments have to be open, honest, and straightforward in their dealings with everybody because that's their job. They're supposed to represent us. It doesn't matter whether it's the City of Tukwila or the City of SeaTac or the County of King or the State of

Washington. They represent us. And because of that, they have a duty of honesty and transparency. The City violated that duty so many times I've lost count, and it is not -- it is -- it's amazing. Quite frankly, the actions of the City of SeaTac in this case are unexplainable and totally unacceptable. The period of deception even lasted through their answer in the public records -- for the public records, for the disclosure. And so the plaintiff had to go about getting those records and had to spend more time and effort and money to get those records than they ever should have had to. Why? Well, the City obviously had something to hide. So I find -- as someone who works for the government, I find this to be the worst thing about this case is the actions of the City and how dishonest they were, and I find that to be completely and totally unacceptable. I don't know how the jury felt about it, but $I$ can only suspect that that was probably one of the reasons why they awarded the damages they did, because they felt the same way I did.

So I've tried to be really fair and reasonable when $I$ have made the award of attorneys' fees. I believe that a lodestar figure of 65 percent on a figure of 1.9 , which is scrubbed before and ends up with, what, about 1.3 , something like that? 1.2, roughly? That an interest rate -- I believe that the case law requires the imposition of
interest. This is constitutional taking, after all, and I believe that 12 percent is what is required. It wouldn't be what I would have chosen, but that's what the legislature has chosen. I would have chosen something around 2 or 3 percent because I think that's probably the real amount of money that was going on in 2009 and 2010. But the legislature didn't feel that way, and we do have to follow the law, and the law says 12 percent. I believe picking a date of December 30th, 2009, as I indicated, is conservative. Could have gone back earlier. But I think that is a date that everyone can agree that Mr. King had lost the property on that date. It seems to be an easy day to pick for purposes of calculating interest.

The last thing I would say, and I would say this to the City of SeaTac. This isn't part of the findings, and I don't want it to be part of the findings. I think the City of SeaTac was very, very ably represented during the course of their trial by Mr. Tierney and Mr. Taylor. I believe that it's hard to make a silk's purse out of a sow's ear. And, gentlemen, you performed incredibly admirably. You were very worthy advocates. And regardless of what you think of me, that's what $I$ think of you, and $I$ don't mind telling anybody that.

But there is certainly some evidence to suggest that during the course of the negotiations with K\&S the City

Attorney's Office participated in this profound and unacceptable pattern of deception. That violates the rules of professional conduct. That is totally and completely unacceptable to this court, and it should be to any court. Lawyers have rules that they have to abide by, and the very first rule of being a lawyer is to be honest, to not allow the client to dictate dishonesty. That was not complied with in this case.

I have never filed a compliant against a lawyer, but I would seriously recommend that you take some advantage to do that, counsel, because that can't be allowed to exist. I don't think Ms. Bartolo, there's no evidence to indicate she had anything to do with this, but there certainly is evidence to indicate that another assistant city attorney did, talked to Mr. Murphy. His testimony rings quite profound to me, and he had never had anybody make representations to him like that. Poor Mr. Murphy, who is now suffering the effects of a stroke, but nevertheless, he mustered the energy to get up and testify that they had never had a city act like that. And when he asked the assistant city attorney what was going on, he was purposely misled. That lawyer should by disciplined. We don't do that. Lawyers don't do that. We are held to a higher standard of care, and for us to disregard that and to allow our clients to dictate the terms of our performance is
unacceptable.
So those are my observations. I want you back here at 1:30 with some proposed findings and an order. Actually, let's make it 2:00. You've got one hour starting at 2:00. I want to see if we can get everything done today.

MR. ANDERSEN: Before you leave, Your Honor, one point of clarification. I'm taking from your order that what you have done is combined the City's request for attorney's fees and our request --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. ANDERSEN: -- and --
THE COURT: There's a set off.
MR. ANDERSEN: Set off of 65 --
THE COURT: That lodestar factor of 65 percent takes into consideration their request and is an offset.

MR. ANDERSEN: Okay. We'll prepare the orders. We'll see you at 2:00?

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE CLERK: Please rise.
(Recess)
THE COURT: We're now on the record. I would like to, first of all, review the order granting attorneys' fees. Now, I didn't come up with a specific figure on paragraph 5
on page 3 for the City. What I tried to do was give the City a significant offset by coming up with the 35 percent lodestar figure. So I'm not sure that the wording of that is what $I$ found. We all get to the same spot, but -MR. HABERTHUR: Your Honor, if I may, that -- I know we were starting with the answer and trying to get back -- work backwards. And so that was the amount the City was requesting, and so we just put the full amount of their fees and the full amount of their costs in there. But I -again, $I$ don't know if that's -- if the Court made a specific finding, but that was the amount that they requested, so I think with that starting figure we could then apply the lodestar.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. HABERTHUR: That was the intent of pulling it there.
THE COURT: All right. So this is -- this corresponds to your $\$ 1,945,000$ figure?

MR. HABERTHUR: And I'll ask Mr. Tierney to correct me, but that was the 44.8 percent that they were requesting. I think they were starting with a higher number.

THE COURT: But that's what they're requesting, and you were requesting $1,945,000$.

MR. HABERTHUR: Oh, yes, that's correct, Your Honor. Yes. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So as to the attorneys' fees
order, is there anything else? That was the last one we got.

So, Mr. Tierney, is there anything that you have to say about that?

MR. TIERNEY: I'm still reading it, Your Honor. I think -- so is the -- and I'm sorry. If I might address Mr. Haberthur, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. TIERNEY: So is the -- this number basically the same as the 35 percent?

MR. HABERTHUR: That was the number that you were requesting.

MR. TIERNEY: Right, right. But 35 percent --
MR. HABERTHUR: Oh.
MR. TIERNEY: Is that -- this is included in the 35 percent?

MR. HABERTHUR: No. So it's -- the 1,945- by 35 percent reduced it to the 1.2 million.

MR. TIERNEY: The 1.2 million. So then what happens to this?

MR. HABERTHUR: Well, I think the 35 percent was to account for the City's fees.

MR. TIERNEY: That's what I'm asking.
MR. HABERTHUR: Yes.
MR. TIERNEY: That -- this number is included in the 35
percent?
MR. HABERTHUR: Yes.
MR. TIERNEY: Okay.
MR. HABERTHUR: Yes.
MR. TIERNEY: All right.
Sorry, Your Honor. I think I'm clear on it now.
THE COURT: So paragraph 6, I understand -- I had the same issue, Mr. Tierney. Paragraph 6, I think, clarifies what he was trying to do, which is to offset the attorneys' fees that the plaintiff owes the City. And in large part, that's why I reduced it by 35 percent. That was the biggest reason for that. So therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the City $\$ 1,269,587.32$. I will trust that you did the math right.

And then, on line 13 of page 4, there's an offset of costs.

MR. HABERTHUR: Yes, Your Honor. This -- starting with the -- the City was requesting the $46,173.91$, which $I$ understand included their expert fees and their costs. Once --

THE COURT: And I whittled your costs down to 249,000 from what you had originally --

MR. HABERTHUR: Yes.
THE COURT: -- requested by reducing Mr. Johnson's fee and eliminating Mr. Hill's fee.

MR. HABERTHUR: That's correct, Your Honor. So put us at 249. And then I assume, just granting from there the cost awards gave a net award of 202,986 to $K \& S$, so it gave the City the benefit of their full cost amount.

THE COURT: Right. I'm going to ask you both to sign this. I'm going to sign it.

You only have to sign copy received, Mr. Tierney. You don't have to sign anything else, but $I$ want to make sure there's a record of you receiving it.

So, Mr. Andersen, would you come up and sign it?
MR. ANDERSEN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And give it to Mr. Tierney to have him sign it as well, please. Thank you.

Mr. Andersen, I see that you went to the same school of handwriting as many of the physicians $I$ know.

MR. ANDERSEN: Always deniability.
THE COURT: But it's not plausible.
All right. Next is an order -- let's see. Oh. Findings of fact and conclusions of law. Well, you've got it down to 17 pages.

MR. ANDERSEN: Can I be heard real quickly, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. ANDERSEN: So two things that $I$ did, was, yeah, I got it -- you said between 30 and 35 . In some ways $I$ did combine --

THE COURT: I saw.
MR. ANDERSEN: -- a couple. But here's -- I could take more out, and $I$ guess starting on page 8.

THE COURT: I'm not really sure $I$ want you to, Counsel.
MR. ANDERSEN: Okay. The only things I thought I could take out was I provided several examples of things that the Kingens would not have been able to know until after they did the Public Disclosures Act, and I see that that took up several paragraphs. So I think it's important for the statute of limitations, but I may have gone -- I may have provided more examples than necessary, but -- so that was the only place I think I could probably cut some more out, if you wanted to.

THE COURT: No. Leave it in. I saw that and it -- but I understand what you were trying to do.

MR. ANDERSEN: Great, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And when an appellate court looks at this, they need to at least have a record before them as to what I was thinking when the findings and order were entered, because it's really important that they have the same information before them that we have before us, and so I don't have any problem with you being overinclusive. I just thought that you were overboard on the first draft. MR. ANDERSEN: I was. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Tierney, any comments?

MR. TIERNEY: Well, I haven't -- honestly, Your Honor, have not finished these.

THE COURT: There isn't anything really new on here. I think they tried to synthesize and summarize some comments, but it's basically a shorter version of what was previously submitted.

There isn't anything new that $I$ saw in here, Mr. Andersen. Is there anything new that you presented?

MR. ANDERSEN: No. I adopted a few that Mr. Tierney had submitted to you that were a little bit shorter. So I tried to merge them as much as $I$ could, including the $\$ 12$ million. I'm kidding, Your Honor.

MR. TIERNEY: Well, maybe I'd just say we'll stand on what we've already submitted on the comments on the first draft.

THE COURT: Thank you. I have signed the findings of facts and conclusions.

MR. ANDERSEN: Are they -- is there a place for us to sign on those?

THE COURT: There might be. I took the liberty of dating your typed signatures on the judgment, counsel.

MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I've signed the final judgment. Those numbers are consistent with your findings of fact and conclusions of law. I double-checked them myself. MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, Counsel, good luck.
MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: I've never had a case quite like this. And I've got to admit to you that I learned a lot. And I appreciate the good lawyering on both sides, and I thank you very much.

MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. TIERNEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I hope you will have a good day.
MALE SPEAKER: We want to tell you thank you. And your staff, especially Lisa, was extremely patient.

MR. TIERNEY: Your Honor, one question here on the judgment.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. TIERNEY: It's just an arithmetic question, and so I'll just ask. Is this the net of what was awarded to $K \& S$ minus what was awarded to the City? Because it looks like it was the gross of what was awarded.

MR. ANDERSEN: Well, it could be.
THE COURT: Well, it says in the body -- if we go down and look, it says that -- on page 2, on paragraph -- I'm sorry, page 3 paragraph 2 top of the page it says that you subtracted the amount of 257,000 , but did you really is his question.

MR. ANDERSEN: Your Honor, I think I missed that and

Mr. Tierney's right.
THE COURT: It says you did. I took you at your word.
MR. ANDERSEN: Well, it all adds up. I just didn't
subtract that one.
MR. TIERNEY: No, it didn't. According to this, it didn't. Do you want this?

THE COURT: I don't think you did.
MR. ANDERSEN: I did not.

THE COURT: And I missed -- I'm sorry. I apologize to Mr. Tierney and Mr. Taylor. I missed that also the first time because I just read that top paragraph and assumed you did what you said you did.

MR. ANDERSEN: Yes.
THE COURT: So perhaps your assistant could make a couple of changes and --

MR. ANDERSEN: Yeah. So let's --
THE COURT: -- email us a new version. We're not going to use that one.

MALE SPEAKER: So, Your Honor, are you saying Mr. Haberthur messed up?

MR. HABERTHUR: It's not the first time.
MALE SPEAKER: Are there any of your third-year law students that are looking for an associate's position?

THE COURT: There's one right behind you.
I think I'm going to do some math too and let's compare
numbers. And I think you have to recalculate the interest, too, because I'm just going to give you the interest on the net, not on the gross, so that means the 9.5 minus the $\$ 257,000$. So the whole thing has to be recalculated.

MR. HABERTHUR: Okay. Your Honor --
THE COURT: I got $\$ 9,332,469.72$.
MR. HABERTHUR: Yes. That's what I have as well.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. HABERTHUR: And I believe the interest number shouldn't change. Because if you do interest on the net, that's giving the City interest from 2009 forward. So wouldn't it be interest on the award to $K \& S$, and then going forward from today's date interest would be on that net number? Did I explain that right?

THE COURT: Um-hum.
MR. HABERTHUR: I think it would be a pretty sizable change.

THE COURT: Well, if we think this through, the City is entitled to interest on their judgment because of the breach of contract, but it seems to me that -- when does that -- so when does that interest begin?

MR. HABERTHUR: I would argue it begins today because it wasn't a liquidated amount. They wouldn't get prejudgment interest on that. I mean, even in the complaint it argues that amounts be proven at the time of trial.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. HABERTHUR: So I think it's got to be interest on the City's amount -- well, the net amount beginning today going forward.

THE COURT: Which reduces your principle upon which the interest is calculated.

MR. HABERTHUR: Correct.
THE COURT: I agree. Make the change.
MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So if you want to give her figures, I'll come back on the bench in a couple of minutes and sign the final version.

MR. HABERTHUR: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let Lisa know when you're ready.
MR. HABERTHUR: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.
THE CLERK: Please rise.
(Brief pause in proceedings)
THE COURT: I have signed the final judgment. The figures appear to be consistent.

And I guess I would have to say congratulations to you.
MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you.
THE COURT: To all three of you.
MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think that we had a fairly extraordinary jury. They were willing to sacrifice greatly to be here over some, you know -- over a difficult time, because it was the holidays and then the first of the year and the inclement weather and everything else, and yet they did that, so --

MALE SPEAKER: I always wondered what happened to Juror No. 15 that lost his job, but maybe you can't say it on the record, but --

THE COURT: I don't know.
MALE SPEAKER: Okay.
THE COURT: I mean, if I knew I would probably say, but I don't -- I don't have any idea.

MALE SPEAKER: That was unfortunate.
THE COURT: Yeah. He's a pretty talented guy. He was the mortgage guy. And he's a pretty talented guy, so $I$ would think that he could find something that hopefully would be a better job than the one that he lost.

MALE SPEAKER: I mean, it was just too bad where he played -- the school that he played basketball for wasn't a very good school, if I remember right.

THE COURT: Well, he's -- he was a big man. I suspect he was quite a force underneath the basket, but...

So, counsel, I've signed this. Lisa has made copies and you'll each get a copy. I sincerely wish everybody in this
room the best of luck, and I thank you very much for your professionalism and for your hard work in this case. MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good luck to everybody. MR. HABERTHUR: Thank you.
(Hearing concluded)

C ERTIEICATE

STATE OF WASHINGTON

COUNTY OF KING

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing court proceedings were transcribed under my direction as a certified transcriptionist; and that the transcript is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and ability, including any changes made by the trial judge reviewing the transcript; that $I$ received the audio and/or video files in the court format; that $I$ am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially interested in its outcome.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 11th day of July, 2016.

Shanna Barr, CETD

