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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

K & S DEVELOPMENTS, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SEATAC, et al,

Defendants.

Consolidated Under
Case No. 12-2-40564-6 KNT

**PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

CITY OF SEATAC,

Plaintiff,

v.

GERALD and KATHRYN KINGEN,

Defendants.

Date: September 11, 2015
With Oral Argument

I. INTRODUCTION

K&S purchased the real property, commonly known as the SeaTac Center, located at 15247 International Boulevard in the City of SeaTac in 2003 (the “Property”). K&S used the Property as security to purchase and develop the Property, including infusing millions of dollars in remodeling the existing commercial building.

1 As part of its development plans, K&S began meeting with the City of SeaTac
2 (“City”) in 2004 to develop a 1,200 stall “park-and-fly” parking facility. In February
3 2006, the City Planning Department tried to stop K&S in its tracks by having the City
4 Council surreptitiously adopt an emergency moratorium. When the City Council later
5 learned the facts, it directed its staff to negotiate a development agreement that would
6 allow K&S to proceed with its proposed 1,200 stall park-and-fly. The council members
7 also directed its Staff to enter into an agreement with K&S on July 11, 2006 that it
8 would support the terms of a particular Development Agreement that was attached to
9 that letter agreement.

10 Through its conduct, the City Council led K&S to believe that it would approve
11 the proposed park-and-fly in return for K&S not challenging the City’s zoning actions.

12 But 15 months later, and after many delays caused, at least in part, by the City
13 Staff, the City did a complete reversal and rejected the proposed park-and-fly. The
14 City’s change in course was seemingly due to the (1) City Staff’s failure to comply with
15 its July 11, 2006 contractual obligations to “fully support” the development agreement,
16 (2) City’s secret desire to acquire K&S’s property for economic development
17 purposes—the City did not believe K&S was the right entity to own the property, (3)
18 the City’s desire to protect its pecuniary interest in constructing its own competing
19 parking garage closer to the SeaTac Airport, and (4) the self-serving and discriminating
20 views of at least one council member personally affected by the proposed park-and-fly.

21 After three years of being led down a primrose path, and spending substantial
22 sums of time and money on the project, K&S had no financial option but to abandon the
23 proposed park-and-fly and pursue a multi-family development. But the City was still
24 not satisfied. Still improperly believing that K&S was the wrong property owner or
25 developer to accomplish the City’s specific economic vision for the property, the City
26

1 continued its scheme of using its regulatory powers to hamper K&S's planned
2 development and reduce the value of the property. Instead of working with K&S in
3 good faith as required under the Development Agreement, the City was lying in wait to
4 acquire the property as the "phantom" buyer. And instead of cooperating in K&S's
5 efforts to implement the Development Agreement, the City was attempting to frustrate
6 K&S's development efforts. Unfortunately, K&S only learned the true reasons for the
7 City's actions after the City acquired its property.

8 The City's actions and delays caused K&S to incur additional debt, fees, and
9 financing costs related to the Property. After delays, bad faith negotiations, and other
10 misconduct, the City eventually reneged on its promise to provide a development
11 agreement for the proposed park-and-fly. The City then secretly hired Colliers to
12 represent it as an undisclosed principal to acquire the Property in order to take
13 advantage of the financial strain that its actions had placed on K&S. But instead of
14 approaching K&S about acquiring the property, which the City had done with other
15 similarly situated property owners, Colliers and the City took the unprecedented action
16 of contacting K&S's lenders to try and force a foreclosure of the property, even though
17 K&S had negotiated a forbearance agreement.

18 The City, acting through Colliers, offered to purchase the promissory notes
19 secured against the Property from K&S's lenders, provided K&S would first sign
20 agreements to provide a deed in lieu of foreclosure (the "DIL Agreements") (the Deed
21 in Lieu is abbreviated as "DIL"). And despite Colliers repeated representations to the
22 contrary, the only way the City could have accomplished the transaction under the
23 Washington State Constitution¹ was for K&S to agree to sign a DIL. In other words,
24
25

26 ¹ Art. 8, § 5 and Art. 8, § 7 prohibit cities from lending its credit to private enterprises, such as K&S.

1 K&S had to be part of the transaction between Colliers, representing the anonymous
2 City, and the lenders or the entire transaction would fail.

3 K&S had no choice but to sign the DIL Agreements on December 24, 2009 (the
4 “DIL Transaction”) as the City’s misconduct prevented it from developing the Property.
5 Due to all of the Defendants’ concealment, misconduct, and misrepresentations, K&S
6 did not know at that time that Colliers represented the City, that the City was to be the
7 beneficiary of the DIL Agreements, or that the City was acting to acquire the Property.

8 The City, acting through Colliers, purchased the promissory notes secured
9 against the Property on or about December 31, 2009. The lenders assigned the DIL
10 Agreements to the City. By purchasing the promissory notes, the City acquired the
11 Property for millions of dollars less than the fair market value. And then, at risk of
12 further legal jeopardy, K&S signed the required Deed on December 31, 2009. But
13 K&S’s execution of the Deed was a ministerial act because it had previously signed
14 away its rights to the property on December 24, 2009 through the Deed in Lieu of
15 Foreclosure.

16 Once it learned the truth from its public records request, K&S filed its lawsuit
17 against the City, various City officials, and Colliers. K&S has continued to discover
18 additional facts through discovery (third party subpoenas) that further show the City’s
19 misconduct.

20 After losing its efforts to have K&S’s lawsuit dismissed, the City retaliated
21 against the principals of K&S (Gerald and Kathryn Kingen and Scott and Cheri
22 Switzer) and their consultant (Paul Krakow) by alleging five causes of action. In the
23 process, the City violated the automatic stay of the United States Bankruptcy Code
24 when it sued the Switzers. After being sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Court, and
25 attempting to re-work its allegations, the City eventually capitulated and dismissed the
26

1 Switzers. The City also dismissed Mr. Krakow and his spouse. The City then
2 consolidated the two lawsuits.

3 In a twist of irony, the City's claims against the Kingens boil down to the fact
4 that it believes the Kingens interfered with its acquisition of the Property and that it
5 failed to disclose certain terms as part of the DIL. The City claims the Kingens violated
6 promises and representations they made in the DIL by having K&S sue the City. The
7 City is essentially trying, by filing this second lawsuit and then consolidating the two
8 cases, to pierce K&S's corporate veil and impose personal liability on the Kingens.
9 Similar to its threats to go after the Kingens on their personal guarantees under the
10 loans, the City is using this lawsuit to intimidate the Kingens against challenging the
11 City's actions.

12 The court should dismiss the City's lawsuit against the Kingens because it
13 hinges upon a total misunderstanding of K&S's lawsuit against the City and it
14 completely ignores corporate formalities without any valid or lawful reason. K&S does
15 not seek to rescind the DIL. After all, why would anyone in K&S's shoes ever want to
16 own property within a jurisdiction that it cannot trust and has acted in this manner?

17 K&S seeks damages for the taking of their property (the City paid millions of
18 dollars less than the property's fair market value). K&S also seeks economic damages
19 for the City's misconduct of (1) stalling K&S's parking garage, (2) improperly rejecting
20 K&S's proposed park-and-fly, (3) delaying and frustrating K&S's overall development
21 of the property for improper purposes, and (4) failing to disclose its interest in acquiring
22 the property at a time when it was legally and contractually obligated to work with K&S
23 on the development. K&S does not seek to rescind the transaction; it wants damages for
24 what the City did.

1 The City’s lawsuit against the Kingens fails because the Kingens did not owe
2 any individual duties to the City. The Kingens were part owners of K&S, but never had
3 any privity of contract with the City. The Kingens therefore owed no duties to the City
4 and the Kingens did not personally make any representations, misrepresentations, or
5 omissions to the City.

6 Assuming the City can prove that there *was* misrepresentations made, there is no
7 evidence that, at the time the agreements were signed, the Kingens knew or had reason
8 to know that the representations were untrue—the fact that K&S discovered facts after
9 the City acquired the property does not mean the documents were false when they were
10 signed.

11 And finally, the City claims the Kingens have interfered with the City’s business
12 expectancy. What business expectancy? The City owns the property and neither K&S
13 nor the Kingens have done anything to interfere with the City’s ownership.

14 II. SUMMARY OF FACTS²

15 A. City’s Delays Caused K&S Significant Financial Harm

16 During the City’s delays in negotiating the Development Agreement, K&S
17 incurred additional costs associated with managing and maintaining the Property.³ K&S
18 was forced to borrow additional funds to cover those costs.⁴ K&S eventually had four
19 loans secured against the Property.⁵ The first position loan was from Avatar Income
20 Fund I, LLC (“Avatar”) for \$6.5 million;⁶ the second position loan was from Centrum
21 Financial Services, Inc. (“Centrum”) for \$4.5 million;⁷ the third position loan was from

22 _____
23 ² The facts are set forth extensively in K&S’s prior Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. K&S only
24 incorporates the prior Motion and Memorandum and only re-states those sections relevant to its current
25 Motion.

26 ³ Kingen Dec., ¶11.

⁴ Richard Dec., ¶12, Ex. 10 (Kingen Dep., 114:23-115:8).

⁵ Kingen Dec., ¶11.

⁶ Kingen Dec., ¶11, Ex. F.

⁷ Kingen Dec., ¶11, Ex. G.

1 Velocity Capital Partners, LLC, (“Velocity”) for \$560,000;⁸ and the fourth position loan
2 was from Dan Kirby for \$560,000.⁹ The first three loans—Avatar, Centrum, and
3 Velocity—were personally guaranteed by K&S’s principals, Gerald Kingen and Scott
4 Switzer.¹⁰

5 K&S originally intended to refinance all of its debt based on the financial
6 strength of the park-and-fly project.¹¹ However, as a result of the City’s decision to
7 eliminate the park-and-fly at the eleventh hour, MasterPark was no longer interested in
8 financing the development project and K&S was unable to refinance its debt.¹²

9 In 2009, K&S found itself in a difficult financial position and fell behind on its
10 loan payments.¹³ Centrum, the second position lender, initiated a foreclosure action
11 against K&S on May 5, 2009, and moved for summary judgment in August 2009.¹⁴ By
12 this time, Centrum had reached agreement with Avatar that it would keep Avatar
13 current. Centrum had taken over the negotiations with K&S as any deal that it reached
14 with K&S would also impact Avatar. K&S had made significant progress towards
15 developing the Property and still intended to benefit from the Property so it negotiated a
16 forbearance agreement with Centrum, which included Avatar (the “Forbearance
17 Agreement”).¹⁵ Accordingly, Centrum struck its summary judgment motion on October
18 16, 2009,¹⁶ and K&S made three monthly payments of \$38,000 each in furtherance of
19 the Forbearance Agreement.¹⁷ K&S was also in the process of working out similar

21 ⁸ Kingen Dec., ¶11, Ex. H. Velocity alleged that it made an additional loan to K&S for another \$560,000
but it was not secured against the Property.

22 ⁹ Kingen Dec., ¶11.

23 ¹⁰ Kingen Dec., ¶11. Mr. Kingen is currently the only member and manager of K&S; Mr. Switzer is no
longer involved.

24 ¹¹ Kingen Dec., ¶12.

25 ¹² Kingen Dec., ¶12.

26 ¹³ Richard Dec., ¶12, Ex. 10 (Kingen Dep., 23:23-24:1), Kingen Dec., ¶12.

¹⁴ Kingen Dec., ¶13.

¹⁵ Kingen Dec., ¶13, Ex. I.

¹⁶ Richard Dec., ¶13, Ex. 11.

¹⁷ Kingen Dec., ¶13, Ex. J.

1 arrangements with its other lenders. None of the other lenders had initiated any type of
2 foreclosure as they were working with K&S.

3 **B. The Deed-in-Lieu of Foreclosure Transaction**

4 **1. After learning that K&S was in foreclosure, the City decided to buy**
5 **the notes from K&S's lenders to force the transfer of the Property.**

6 Unbeknownst to K&S, the City engaged commercial broker Arvin VanderVeen
7 from Colliers International WA, LLC ("Colliers") in early to mid-2009 to find a way to
8 anonymously acquire K&S's Property.¹⁸ The City and Colliers saw the Centrum
9 foreclosure action and K&S's vulnerability as a way for the City to obtain K&S's
10 Property for a significantly reduced value.¹⁹ Jeffrey Robinson, the City's Economic
11 Development Manager, and Todd Cutts, who was then the Assistant City Manager,
12 decided they wanted to find a way to acquire the Property for less than \$12 million.²⁰
13 Colliers and the City decided that, rather than approach K&S on the open market or use
14 the City's traditional condemnation powers to acquire the Property for fair market
15 value, the City would negotiate deals directly with K&S's lenders to acquire K&S's
16 debt.²¹ The City could then use those agreements as leverage to anonymously put
17 pressure on K&S by threatening foreclosure and deficiency judgments to convince K&S
18 to transfer the Property via deed in lieu of foreclosure.²² This was an unprecedented
19 plan of attack.²³ To keep the City's interest and actions a secret, the City acted as a
20 "phantom buyer" and refused to disclose its involvement to K&S.²⁴

21 In order to put the plan into action, Colliers and the City engaged commercial
22

23 ¹⁸ Richard Dec., ¶18, Ex. 16 (Deposition of Arvin VanderVeen, 58:14-25).

24 ¹⁹ Richard Dec., ¶37, Ex. 35 (Special Meeting Transcript, 7:20-22).

25 ²⁰ Richard Dec., ¶16, Ex. 14.

26 ²¹ Richard Dec., ¶37, Ex. 35 (Special Meeting Transcript, 8:3-10).

²² Kingen Dec., ¶¶16-17.

²³ Richard Dec., ¶18, Ex. 16 (Deposition of Arvin VanderVeen, 53:12-15).

²⁴ Richard Dec., ¶17, Ex. 15.

1 loan broker Thomas R. Hazelrigg, III, now serving a sentence of 4.5 years in federal
2 prison for tax evasion—who Colliers described as the “king pin between all of these
3 lending entities”²⁵—to “use his mussel [sic]” to convince K&S’s lenders to sell their
4 notes and release their interests in the Property.²⁶ By November 2009, Colliers and the
5 City had successfully reached agreements with all four of K&S’s lenders.²⁷ On
6 November 24, 2009, VanderVeen, as a nominee for an undisclosed principal, executed
7 loan purchase agreements with Avatar for \$7.15 million and Centrum for \$4 million
8 (the “Avatar Loan Purchase Agreement”²⁸ and the “Centrum Loan Purchase
9 Agreement”²⁹ respectively), and agreed to pay \$100,000 to Velocity and \$100,000 to
10 Kirby to release their deeds of trust.³⁰ The City refused to purchase the Velocity and
11 Kirby loans.³¹

12 **2. The City and Colliers used improper threats and misrepresentations**
13 **to force K&S to relinquish the Property for a reduced value.**

14 With the loan purchase agreements in place with the lenders, the City needed
15 K&S to agree to transfer the Property to the phantom buyer via a deed-in-lieu of
16 foreclosure. The City used Colliers to put enormous pressure on K&S. First, they
17 attempted to exert pressure on K&S through K&S’s lenders. For example, on December
18 2, 2009, Robinson directed VanderVeen to tell “Centrum to put the pedal to the metal
19 and tell [K&S] to sign the doc today or there is a high probability the ‘buyer’ will walk
20 and they can meet in court!”³²

21 K&S did not want to transfer the Property as it believed the Property “had great
22

23 ²⁵ Richard Dec., ¶19, Ex. 17.

²⁶ Richard Dec., ¶17, Ex. 15.

²⁷ Richard Dec., ¶¶19-21, Exs. 17-19.

²⁸ Richard Dec., ¶20, Ex. 18.

²⁹ Richard Dec., ¶21, Ex. 19.

³⁰ Richard Dec., ¶22, Ex. 20.

³¹ Richard Dec., ¶25, Ex. 23.

³² Richard Dec., ¶23, Ex. 21.

1 value...value far greater than what this entity, who we had know [sic] idea who it was,
2 was proposing to pay for our property”³³, was negotiating DA amendments with the
3 City³⁴, and was working with consultants to finalize the development plans.³⁵ K&S
4 believed it had found a workable solution to profitably develop the Property, and it had
5 already worked out loan extensions with its lenders. Additionally, the phantom buyer
6 was refusing to assume the Velocity debt as part of the proposed transaction and K&S
7 was not interested in a deal that did not at the very least extinguish all of the debt and
8 guarantees.³⁶

9 Given K&S’s unwillingness to transfer the Property, VanderVeen initiated a
10 new round of threats that included direct intimidation from the anonymous buyer. On
11 December 8, 2009, VanderVeen wrote to K&S:

12 Talked to my guy and he was ready to kill the entire deal until we talked
13 awhile, he is going to think about this overnight. He may just buy the
14 first and second, go after the personal guarantees which we are told at
15 full tilt could be up to \$12 million and \$10 million not counting Velocity,
16 get the judgments and then foreclose himself out on the second and take
17 the property also. A lot of hassle but very do able and would be very
18 costly to Gerry [Kingen]. I think you would be wise to rethink your
19 Velocity request. Will let you know in the morning.³⁷

20 Presumably, this threat was cooked up with the assistance of the now convicted felon,
21 Hazelrigg. Not only did the City and Colliers continue to mislead K&S and hide the
22 City’s involvement by referring to the buyer as “my guy” and “he,” but now Colliers
23 was threatening K&S with direct action from this unknown person and taking aim at
24 Mr. Kingen personally.³⁸ The possibility that an anonymous “guy” that K&S and Mr.

25 ³³ Richard Dec., ¶12, Ex. 10 (Kingen Dep., 38:9-38:11).

26 ³⁴ Kingen Dec., ¶14.

³⁵ Kingen Dec., ¶15.

³⁶ Richard Dec., ¶25, Ex. 23.

³⁷ Richard Dec., ¶26, Ex. 24 (emphasis added).

³⁸ Richard Dec., ¶26, Ex. 24 (emphasis added).

1 Kingen knew nothing about, who was going to great lengths to protect his identity, and
2 was going to buy the notes and come after K&S and its principals personally was a
3 daunting and intimidating prospect.³⁹ Moreover, K&S's Forbearance Agreement with
4 Centrum included a clause which provided that the Forbearance Agreement would
5 terminate if Centrum were to sell the loan.⁴⁰ If Colliers' secret principal were to buy the
6 Centrum loan, K&S would lose the protection of the Forbearance Agreement and be
7 subject to foreclosure and a potential deficiency judgment.⁴¹ The City knew it lacked
8 the ability to buy the notes and foreclose the loans, yet it had Colliers represent
9 otherwise to K&S.

10 Third, the City and Colliers came up with yet another means to improperly
11 pressure K&S. The City and Colliers used Hazelrigg to get Avatar⁴²—the first position
12 lender—to send a letter to K&S stating that the balance of the Avatar loan was
13 \$10,181,970.25 and that Avatar would revoke its \$7.15 million payoff amount if K&S
14 did not agree to transfer the Property to the anonymous entity by December 14, 2009.⁴³
15 Both the City and Colliers knew Avatar's representations were false because the Avatar
16 Loan Purchase Agreement specifically stated that the Avatar loan was only
17 \$7,434,837.30 and Avatar had no intention of revoking the payoff amount.⁴⁴ As stated
18 by VanderVeen:

19 [Hazelrigg] had his son issue a letter from Avatar that said the debt on
20 the first is about \$10,500,000 (I will send it to you) and that he
21 understands they are dragging their feet and if the DIL isn't executed and
22 in escrow by the 14th he is pulling his payoff of \$7,150,000 off of the
23 table. **Now we know better but they don't as it really got their**

24 ³⁹ Kingen Dec., ¶¶16-19.

⁴⁰ Kingen Dec., ¶13, Ex. I (Forbearance Agreement § 10).

⁴¹ Kingen Dec., ¶13, Ex. I (Forbearance Agreement § 10).

⁴² Avatar is run by Hazelrigg's son, Thomas R. Hazelrigg, IV.

⁴³ Richard Dec., ¶27, Ex. 25.

⁴⁴ Richard Dec., ¶20, Ex. 18.

1 **attention.**⁴⁵

2 Fourth, the City was in a unique position because it was able to use its ongoing
3 negotiations with K&S regarding the Development Agreement to increase the pressure
4 on K&S. K&S wanted to develop mid-rise towers in order to take advantage of the
5 needs of the housing market and cheaper construction costs. K&S's architect had an
6 initial meeting with the City in November 2009 to discuss the idea, which was
7 favorably received by the City. K&S then scheduled a meeting with the City for
8 December 20, 2009 to discuss modifying the DA.⁴⁶ However, the City refused to meet
9 with K&S and, on December 18, 2009, the City cancelled the meeting.⁴⁷ K&S would
10 later learn that Robinson directed the City attorney to cancel the meeting and to wait
11 until after the New Year, because by "then hopefully it will be moot," as the City
12 intended to acquire the Property on or before December 31, 2009.⁴⁸

13
14 The City's unwillingness to meet to discuss the Development Agreement put
15 enormous pressure on K&S to accept the deal being forced upon it by Colliers' secret
16 principal.⁴⁹ K&S was faced with the possibility that the City would engage in the same
17 dilatory tactics it used throughout the four year negotiation of the Development
18 Agreement, unreasonably refuse to amend the Starbucks clause before February 28,
19 2010, and take the position that the Development Agreement was terminated.⁵⁰ At the
20 time, K&S was unaware that all of the sources of pressure were being applied by the
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24 ⁴⁵ Richard Dec., ¶28, Ex. 26.

⁴⁶ Kingen Dec., ¶15.

⁴⁷ Kingen Dec., ¶15.

⁴⁸ Richard Dec., ¶29, Ex. 27.

⁴⁹ Kingen Dec., ¶15.

⁵⁰ Kingen Dec., ¶15.

1 same entity.⁵¹

2 **3. The City was successful in forcing the transfer of the Property for**
3 **reduced value.**

4 All of the pressure and threats eventually became too much for K&S.⁵² On
5 December 24, 2009, still unaware that the note buyer was the City,⁵³ K&S executed the
6 DIL Agreement with Centrum, in which K&S promised to provide a deed-in-lieu of
7 foreclosure to the anonymous buyer that purchased Centrum's loan.⁵⁴ K&S had no other
8 choice—the City was refusing to meet to finalize the amendment to the Development
9 Agreement and the phantom buyer was threatening to buy K&S's debt, nullify the
10 Forbearance Agreement, foreclose, and exercise the personal guarantees of K&S's
11 members.⁵⁵

12 On the evening of December 29, 2009—after K&S had executed the DIL
13 Agreement—the City finally revealed itself to K&S as the purchaser of the notes and
14 acquirer of the Property.⁵⁶ When K&S learned the City was the beneficiary of the DIL
15 Agreement, it was in a state of shock and disbelief.⁵⁷ Given the City's conduct, K&S
16 believed the City to be capable of anything and did what it could to preserve its rights
17 and potential claims for relief against the City.⁵⁸

18 **4. City Officials used the low acquisition cost as the main selling point**

19 The City Council did not publicly approve the acquisition of the Property until
20 after the Loan Purchase Agreements and the DIL Agreement were fully executed.⁵⁹ The
21 decision to acquire K&S's Property in the manner in which it did had already been

22 ⁵¹ Kingen Dec., ¶16-17.

23 ⁵² Kingen Dec., ¶17.

24 ⁵³ Kingen Dec., ¶17.

25 ⁵⁴ Richard Dec., ¶31, Ex. 29.

26 ⁵⁵ Kingen Dec., ¶¶15-17.

⁵⁶ Richard Dec., ¶32, Ex. 30.

⁵⁷ Kingen Dec., ¶18.

⁵⁸ Kingen Dec., ¶¶18-19.

⁵⁹ Richard Dec., ¶3, Ex. 1.

1 made by the City officials and approved by the Council, in secret, in or before
2 September 2009. The December 29, 2009 public meeting was merely to formalize what
3 had already been approved and acted upon in private.⁶⁰ During the meeting, the City
4 officials provided a summary of some of what they had been doing for the past few
5 months, highlighted the economics and great value the City would be receiving, and
6 asked the Council members to provide final approval:

7
8 It's currently listed by a brokerage for \$20,804,000, which equates to
9 \$112.43 a square foot. The King County assessed valuation of all three
10 parcels is just a bit over \$19,189,000, almost nineteen million one
11 ninety.⁶¹

12 In June of 2009, the property was appraised at \$16,500,000 by CB
13 Richard Ellis Valuation & Advisory Services. The acquisition price for
14 the notes that we are acquiring...is \$11,350,000, which equates to \$61.40
15 a square foot. And the anticipated all-in acquisition costs, which includes
16 due diligence, outside legal counsel, our commission, is \$12,400,000, or
17 about \$69 a square foot.⁶²

18 Negotiations with the current lenders were undertaken through the City's
19 commercial broker on behalf of us as a City, who were identified as an
20 undisclosed buyer. Discounted note acquisition amounts were agreed
21 upon, and the documents to effect the transfer of the property were
22 drafted and distributed for signature.⁶³

23 The City officials further gloated about the value of the property to the
24 Council, stating:

25 So we feel strongly that, at such a time as the market is ripe for
26 development, that this property will certainly sell for what we think the
27 appraised value indicates, which is 16.5 million, and with the

⁶⁰ A copy of the full transcript from that special meeting is attached as Exhibit 35 to the Declaration of Michael Richard.

⁶¹ Richard Dec., ¶37, Ex. 35 (Special Meeting Transcript, 5:22-25, 6:1-2).

⁶² Richard Dec., ¶37, Ex. 35 (Special Meeting Transcript, 6:3-11).

⁶³ Richard Dec., ¶37, Ex. 35 (Special Meeting Transcript, 8:11-17).

1 improvements that we're planning to make as a City, probably closer to
2 what the assessed value is, which is almost 20 million.⁶⁴

3 The transaction closed on December 31, 2009.⁶⁵ The City took assignment of
4 the Avatar and Centrum notes,⁶⁶ and then exchanged those notes for the Property via a
5 DIL.⁶⁷ The City spent \$12,283,978.29 to acquire a Property it acknowledged was worth
6 at least \$16.5 million.⁶⁸ Indeed, included within the acquisition price was the purchase
7 of a policy of title insurance in the amount of \$16.5 million.⁶⁹

8 The City chose an unprecedented path to buy debt to acquire property in order to
9 avoid paying fair market value. K&S initiated its action to recover just compensation
10 and other associated damages and fees. The City sued the Kingens alleging the
11 following claims: (1) negligent or intentional misrepresentation; (2) civil conspiracy; (3)
12 tortious interference with business expectancy; and, (4) unjust enrichment. K&S moves
13 for summary judgment on these claims.

14 III. ARGUMENT

15 Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact and
16 the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.⁷⁰ The moving party is
17 entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings and affidavits on file show there is no
18 genuine issue of material fact.⁷¹ The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to
19 examine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the plaintiff's formal allegations so
20 that unnecessary trials may be avoided where no genuine issue of material fact exists.⁷²

21 _____
22 ⁶⁴ Richard Dec., ¶37, Ex. 35 (Special Meeting Transcript, 31:23-25, 32:1-4).

⁶⁵ Richard Dec., ¶¶4-7, Exs. 2-5.

⁶⁶ Richard Dec. ¶¶4-5, Ex. 2, 3.

⁶⁷ Richard Dec. ¶6, Ex. 4.

⁶⁸ Richard Dec. ¶7, Ex. 5.

⁶⁹ Richard Dec. ¶8, Ex. 6.

⁷⁰ CR 56(c); *Brown v. Snohomish County Physicians Corp.*, 120 Wn.2d 747, 752, 845 P.2d 334 (1993);
25 and *Marincovich v. Tarabochia*, 114 Wn.2d 271, 274, 787 P.2d 562 (1990)

⁷¹ *Suarez v. Newquist*, 70 Wn. App. 827, 831, 855 P.2d 1200 (1993)

⁷² *Island Air v. La Bar*, 18 Wn. App. 129, 137, 566 P.2d 972 (1977)

1 The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of an issue of
2 material fact.⁷³ The non-moving party then has the burden of submitting competent
3 evidence showing specific disputes as to material facts.⁷⁴ A nonmoving party may not
4 rely on speculation or argumentative assertions where unresolved factual issues remain,
5 nor may it have its affidavits considered at face value.⁷⁵ Rather, the nonmoving party
6 must set forth specific facts that sufficiently rebut the moving party's contentions and
7 disclose that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists.⁷⁶

8 **A. City's Claim for Civil Conspiracy Fails as a Matter of Law**

9 The City alleges the Kingens, Switzers, and Krakows, acting in concert,
10 undertook actions or omissions intended to accomplish an illegal end by legal means, a
11 legal end by illegal means, or an illegal end by illegal means, causing the City damage.
12 The City cannot put forth any admissible evidence to prove its claim. "A plaintiff in a
13 civil conspiracy has the burden of proving the case by a preponderance of the evidence,
14 and must establish the existence of the conspiracy by clear, cogent and convincing
15 evidence."⁷⁷ "An action for civil conspiracy lies when there is an agreement by two or
16 more persons to accomplish some purpose, not in itself unlawful, by unlawful means."⁷⁸

17 The City must prove the Kingens, Switzers, and Krakows "entered into an
18 agreement to accomplish the object of the conspiracy."⁷⁹ The City's evidence must
19 prove "that the circumstances [of the conspiracy] must be inconsistent with a lawful or
20 honest purpose and reasonably consistent *only* with the existence of the conspiracy."⁸⁰

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⁷³ *LaPlante v. State*, 85 Wn.2d 154, 158, 531 P.2d 299 (1975)

23 ⁷⁴ *Ames v. City of Fircrest*, 71 Wn. App. 284, 290, 857 P.2d 1083 (1993)

24 ⁷⁵ *Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co.*, 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986)

25 ⁷⁶ *Dwinnell's Cent. Neon v. Cosmopolitan Chinook Hotel*, 21 Wn. App. 929, 936, 587 P.2d 191 (1978)

26 ⁷⁷ *Sterling v. Thorpe*, 82 Wn. App. 446, 450, 918 P.2d 531 (1996).

⁷⁸ *Id.* at 451.

⁷⁹ *Corbit v. J.I. Case Co.*, 70 Wn.2d 522, 528, 424 P.2d 290 (1967).

⁸⁰ *Id.*

1 The City's Amended Complaint is short on facts alleging the existence of an
2 agreement to accomplish the as yet undefined conspiracy. The City alleges K&S,
3 Kingen, Switzer, and Krakow acted in concert to cause the City to spend over \$12
4 million in public money to deliver benefits to them. The City also alleges K&S, Kingen,
5 Switzer, and Krakow acted in concert to hide material facts, including that they were
6 engaging in the DIL under duress, and that they did not intend to be bound by all of the
7 documents they signed.

8 The City's claim that Kingen, Switzer, and Krakow acted in concert to cause the
9 City to spend over \$12 million in public money to purchase their Property defies logic.
10 First, neither Kingen, Switzer, nor Krakow *knew* the City was the buyer until late
11 December 2009. There was no agreement to cause the City to spend this money—the
12 City was acting on its own volition without any input from K&S, Kingens, Switzer, and
13 Krakow. Second, as the City publicly stated, the Property was worth substantially more
14 than \$12 million when the City acquired it—upwards of \$19 million dollars according
15 to the City. The City has not been financially harmed. Finally, the City was applying the
16 pressure to K&S to close—including having false threats made against it (overstating
17 the loan balance and threatening to buy the notes, foreclose, and pursue Kingen for the
18 deficiency). Kingen, Switzer, and Krakow were under the duress applied by the City
19 and Colliers.

20 K&S cannot conspire with its own officers while the officers are acting in their
21 official capacity. The rational is that since the acts of a corporate agent are the acts of
22 the corporation, a conspiracy among the agents of the corporations, or among an agent
23 of the corporation, is in effect a conspiracy with only one actor—the corporation.
24 Further, Kingens, Switzer, and Krakow are protected under the Intracorporate
25 Conspiracy Doctrine as the interests of the company and the agents are clearly aligned.
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1 Thus, the City's claim for civil conspiracy against Kingens, Switzer, and Krakow is
2 entirely invalid as there was no conspiracy to begin with, and, also, individuals who are
3 members and managers of a LLC are shielded from any liability for civil conspiracy as
4 their conduct does not fall within the "scope of employment" or "scope of agency"
5 exception. Kingens, Switzer, and Krakow have no personal agendas or reason to pursue
6 illegal conduct, but they act as agents of the company in pursuit of bettering the
7 business. The claim for civil conspiracy against Kingens, Switzer, and Krakow is
8 legally unfounded and should be dismissed as a matter of law.

9 The City and Colliers forced K&S to sign the DIL Agreements in order to avoid
10 personal exposure on the loans, a fact that everyone now knows was false. But, in order
11 to prevail on its civil conspiracy claim, the City must identify an *agreement* that
12 Kingen, Switzer, and Krakow entered into. The City cannot establish such agreement by
13 clear, convincing, and cogent evidence because one does not exist. In reality, the City
14 knows the only potential claims are against K&S, the property owner, and not the
15 individuals. In order to circumvent the privity of contract and standing issue, the City
16 has concocted a theory of civil conspiracy.

17 **B. The City's Claim for Intentional or Negligent Misrepresentation Fails as**
18 **a Matter of Law.**

19 K&S executed the DIL as the borrower and grantor conveying the Property to
20 the City. K&S, as Property owner, was the only entity that made, or failed to make,
21 representations regarding the Property. The City seeks to unartfully and improperly
22 pierce the corporate veil and allege claims that it may have, but has not asserted, against
23 K&S against the members of K&S in an effort to put pressure on them similar to what it
24 did in 2009. The City's claims are without merit.

1 The nine elements of intentional misrepresentation (fraud) are: (1)
2 representation of an existing fact, (2) materiality, (3) falsity, (4) the speaker's
3 knowledge of its falsity, (5) intent of the speaker that it should be acted upon by the
4 plaintiff, (6) plaintiff's ignorance of its falsity, (7) plaintiff's reliance on the truth of the
5 representation, (8) plaintiff's right to rely upon the representation, and, (9) damages
6 suffered by the plaintiff.⁸¹ All nine elements of fraud must be established by "clear,
7 cogent and convincing evidence."⁸²

8 The City cannot prove the Kingens misrepresented existing facts or that they
9 knew those facts, if made, were false. Further, the City has no right to rely upon the
10 representations if made, and that the City suffered damage. The City contracted with
11 K&S, any representations made were made by K&S, not the Kingens. The Kingens did
12 not make any statements to the City, thus this claim fails.

13 Similarly, the claim for negligent misrepresentation fails as a matter of law. In
14 order to prove a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the City must prove the
15 following by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: (1) a false statement; (2) made to
16 induce a business transaction; (3) upon which the other party justifiably relies.⁸³ The
17 proof of these elements must be clear, cogent, and convincing.⁸⁴

18 The City must prove the Kingens supplied false information made to induce the
19 City to enter a business transaction with K&S, and the City justifiably relied upon that
20 information. At the outset, the City must prove false statements were made. What false
21 statements is the City relying upon?

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24 ⁸¹ *W. Coast, Inc. v. Snohomish County*, 112 Wn. App. 200, 206, 48 P.3d 997 (2002).

25 ⁸² *Stieneke v. Russi*, 145 Wn. App. 544, 10 P.3d 60 (2006).

26 ⁸³ *Ross v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.*, 135 Wn. App. 182, 143 P.3d 885 (2006), *aff'd in part, disapproved in part on other grounds*, 162 Wn.2d 493, 172 P.3d 701 (2007).

⁸⁴ *Van Dinter v. Orr*, 157 Wn.2d 329, 138 P.3d 608 (2006).

1 The next key point is that K&S, and not the Kingens, were involved in the
2 business transaction. The City's Amended Complaint alleges false information was
3 provided about the Property, and the City relied upon that information. But the City
4 must look to K&S, not the Kingens, as the statements, if any, came from K&S and not
5 the Kingens. In other words, the City seeks to pierce the corporate veil, without a lawful
6 basis, to hold the Kingens liable for K&S's alleged wrongful statements. Finally, the
7 City has not shown that its claims would survive the economic loss rule as it bars claims
8 for intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation if there is a contract
9 between the parties.

10 "The economic loss rule serves to limit parties to their contract remedies when a
11 loss potentially implicates both tort and contract relief. The rule prohibits plaintiff from
12 recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement flows only from a contract
13 because tort law is not intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of a
14 breach of duties assumed only by agreement."⁸⁵

15 The City has included a claim for breach of contract, apparently alleging the
16 Kingens were a party to a contract. The City cannot have it both ways: the Kingens
17 were either a party to a contract that was breached and these claims are barred, or there
18 was no contract and the breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law. Assuming
19 *arguendo* that the City can survive this initial burden, it cannot satisfy the elements of
20 intentional or negligent misrepresentation and these claims should be dismissed.

21 **C. The City's Claim for Tortious Interference with a Business Expectancy**
22 **Fails as a Matter of Law.**

23 The City's third cause of action alleges Kingen, Switzer, and Krakow
24 intentionally interfered with the City's business expectation by improper means and for
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26 ⁸⁵ *Alejandro v. Bull*, 159 Wn.2d 674, 681, 153 P.3d 864 (2007).

1 an improper purpose. The City does not allege any facts in its Amended Complaint to
2 support this claim.

3 To prove tortious interference with a business expectancy, a plaintiff must show
4 (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) that the
5 defendant had knowledge of that expectancy; (3) an intentional interference inducing or
6 causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; (4) that the defendant
7 interfered for an improper purpose or used improper means; and, (5) resulting
8 damages.⁸⁶ “Interference is for an improper purpose if it is wrongful by some measure
9 beyond the interference itself, such as a statute, regulation, recognized rule of common
10 law, or an established standard of trade or profession.”⁸⁷

11 The City cannot satisfy any of the elements. For example, the City omits
12 reference of any valid contractual relationship or business expectancy in its Amended
13 Complaint. As such, Kingen, Switzer, and Krakow could not interfere with a non-
14 existent contract or expectancy. Moreover, the Kingens were not part of the DIL
15 transaction. The Property was K&S, and it was K&S that conveyed the Property to the
16 City. The Kingens did not interfere with a contractual relationship or business
17 expectancy with the City. The City chose not to sue K&S. It instead wants to assert any
18 claims it may have against K&S (there are none as it didn’t allege any counterclaims)
19 directly against the Kingens through an ostensible and unwarranted piercing of the
20 corporate veil in a direct attempt to continue its threats against the Kingens personally.

21 Further, the City does not allege that it had suffered any damages such as a third
22 party breaching an agreement or lost income. The City appears to believe that K&S is
23 seeking return of the Property, and then it would suffer damages. This is not the case,
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25 ⁸⁶ *Newton Ins. Agency & Brokerage v. Caledonian Ins. Group*, 114 Wn. App. 151, 157-58, 52 P.3d 30
(2002).

26 ⁸⁷ *Id.* at 158.

1 and even if true, the Kingens are only members of K&S and are not liable directly to the
2 City. The City must do more than allege it lost “business benefits.” Accordingly, this
3 claim fails as a matter of law.

4 **D. City’s Unjust Enrichment Claim Fails as a Matter of Law**

5 Three elements must be satisfied to sustain a claim based on unjust enrichment:
6 (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or
7 knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the
8 defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
9 defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.⁸⁸

10 The City argues it conferred a benefit on Kingen and Switzer by relieving them
11 of the obligations on their personal guarantees (for the Avatar and Centrum loans only),
12 and this relief far exceeded the \$12 million paid by the City. As stated above, this is not
13 true as the City concedes the Property was worth more than \$19 million in 2009. Thus,
14 K&S was deprived of equity in the Property. The Kingens did not have a benefit
15 conferred upon them when the City took this equity from K&S. Moreover, K&S is not
16 seeking to undo the DIL and get the Property back. Thus, there is no inequitable
17 retention of benefits by the Kingens.

18 The City alleges the Kingens now owe it money to repay the unjust enrichment.
19 The City is wrong. The City stated that it obtained the Property for significantly less
20 than its value—close to a \$7 million savings if it had been required to pay the assessed
21 value (\$19 million). In reality, the City did not confer any benefit on Kingen or Switzer
22 as K&S was left without the Property and any ability to develop the Property, plus they
23 also had the remaining liabilities the City refused to include in the DIL Transaction.

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26 ⁸⁸ *Young v. Young*, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484, 191 P.3d 1258 (2008).

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court should dismiss these claims because they are based upon a misunderstanding of K&S’s lawsuit against the City. K&S is not seeking to rescind the DIL. K&S’s damages are related to the City’s misconduct of stalling K&S, improperly rejecting its park-n-fly, delaying and frustrating K&S’s development of the Property, and failing to disclose its interest in acquiring the Property while it was legally and contractually obligated to work with K&S. The City’s lawsuit is based upon retaliation against the members of K&S in an unlawful and unwarranted attempt to pierce the corporate veil. Because the City cannot prove the required elements of its claims, the claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this 14th day of August, 2015.

LANDERHOLM, P.S.

/s/ Phillip J. Haberthur
BRADLEY W. ANDERSEN, WSBA #20640
PHILLIP J. HABERTHUR, WSBA #38038
Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 The undersigned hereby certifies as follows:

3 1. My name is HEATHER A. DUMONT. I am a citizen of the United
4 States, over the age of eighteen (18) years, a resident of the State of Washington, and
5 am not a party of this action.

6 2. On the 14th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy of the
7 foregoing **PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR**
8 **PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT** was delivered via email and first class United
9 States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

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20 **I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF**
21 **THE STATE OF WASHINGTON THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND**
22 **CORRECT.**

23 DATED: August 14, 2015

24 At: Vancouver, Washington

25 /s/ Heather Dumont
26 HEATHER A. DUMONT